Last week’s FTP hack attempts

Just three since last reboot.
The first to occur was rather standard – a script running just within 20 seconds:

%TCPIP-I-FTP_SESCON, FTP SERVER: session connection from 87-205-178-181.adsl.inetia.pl at 15-NOV-2007 07:43:23.94
%TCPIP-I-FTP_NODE, client host name: 87-205-178-181.adsl.inetia.pl
%TCPIP-I-FTP_USER, user name: anonymous
%TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: WEB_DISK2:[public.anonymous.071115074346p]
%TCPIP-I-FTP_CHINFO, TCPIP$FTPC0000F: Failed to create directory
%SYSTEM-F-NOPRIV, insufficient privilege or object protection violation
%TCPIP-I-FTP_NODE, client host name: 87-205-178-181.adsl.inetia.pl
%TCPIP-I-FTP_USER, user name: anonymous
%TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /pub/
%TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /public/
%TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /_vti_pvt/
%TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /_vti_txt/
%TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /_vti_cfg/
%TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /_vti_log/
%TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /_vti_cnf/
%TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /_private/
%TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /incoming/
%TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /pub/incoming/
%TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /public/incoming/
%TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /public_html/
%TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /upload/
%TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /wwwroot/
%TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /mailroot/
%TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /ftproot/
%TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /home/
%TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /images/
%TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /web/
%TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /www/
%TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /html/
%TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /cgi-bin/
%TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /usr/
%TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /usr/incoming/
%TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /temp/
%TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /~temp/
%TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /tmp/
%TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /~tmp/
%TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /outgoing/
%TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /anonymous/
%TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /anonymous/_vti_pvt/
%TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /anonymous/_vti_cnf/
%TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /anonymous/incoming/
%TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /anonymous/pub/
%TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /anonymous/public/

%TCPIP-I-FTP_SESDCN, FTP SERVER: session disconnection from 87-205-178-181.adsl.inetia.pl at 15-NOV-2007 07:43:41.08

and two other ones, that broke and logged out on failure:

%TCPIP-I-FTP_SESCON, FTP SERVER: session connection from 91.186.25.132 at 15-NOV-2007 09:17:38.43
%TCPIP-I-FTP_NODE, client host name: 91.186.25.132
%TCPIP-I-FTP_USER, user name: anonymous
%TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: WEB_DISK2:[public.anonymous.test]
%TCPIP-I-FTP_CHINFO, TCPIP$FTPC00010: Failed to create directory
%SYSTEM-F-NOPRIV, insufficient privilege or object protection violation
%TCPIP-I-FTP_USER, user name: anonymous
%TCPIP-I-FTP_SESDCN, FTP SERVER: session disconnection from 91.186.25.132 at 15-NOV-2007 09:17:39.04

%TCPIP-I-FTP_SESCON, FTP SERVER: session connection from 202.181.208.119 at 15-NOV-2007 19:47:28.53
%TCPIP-I-FTP_NODE, client host name: 202.181.208.119
%TCPIP-I-FTP_USER, user name: anonymous
%TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: WEB_DISK2:[public.anonymous.test]
%TCPIP-I-FTP_CHINFO, TCPIP$FTPC00011: Failed to create directory
%SYSTEM-F-NOPRIV, insufficient privilege or object protection violation
%TCPIP-I-FTP_USER, user name: anonymous
%TCPIP-I-FTP_SESDCN, FTP SERVER: session disconnection from 202.181.208.119 at 15-NOV-2007 19:47:31.94

Each failure in creating the directory is signalled in Operator.log.

Hide your data!

If you run WordPress, take care on this issue:

How to access the database is stored in module wp-config.php, in your blogs root directory. This file needs to be readable by the PHP engine, based on the UIC. ACL’s are not enough, the current PHP implementation on VMS doesn’t take these in account.
Not that it would help much, since the PHP engine will run under the webserver’s account (or one closely related, depending on the server). in other words: the webserver will ba able to read the file.
So will any user, if he gains access to the file!
In itself, it doesn’t have to be a problem, but if for some reason, the used has access to the directory itself, your database is wide open.

To prevent this to happen, move database access data: the databnase name, username, password and host at least, eventually the suffix, from wp-config.php and store it in a separate file, that is then included in wp-config.php. Store the file in a location that is NOT accessable over the web.

An example: this is the original wp-config.php:

< ?php // ** MySQL settings ** // define('DB_NAME', 'WPDB'); // The name of the database define('DB_USER', 'MyBlogMgr'); // Your MySQL username define('DB_PASSWORD', 'MyDBPassword'); // ...and password define('DB_HOST', 'localhost'); // 99% chance you won't need to change this // You can have multiple installations in one database if you give each a uniqu $table_prefix = 'prfx_'; // Only numbers, letters, and underscores please! // Change this to localize WordPress. A corresponding MO file for the // chosen language must be installed to wp-includes/languages. // For example, install de.mo to wp-includes/languages and set WPLANG to 'de' // to enable German language support. define ('WPLANG', ''); /* That's all, stop editing! Happy blogging. */ define('ABSPATH', dirname(__FILE__).'/'); require_once(ABSPATH.'wp-settings.php'); ?>

This is the new one:

< ?php require_once('/closet/dbaccess.php'); // Change this to localize WordPress. A corresponding MO file for the // chosen language must be installed to wp-includes/languages. // For example, install de.mo to wp-includes/languages and set WPLANG to 'de' // to enable German language support. define ('WPLANG', ''); /* That's all, stop editing! Happy blogging. */ define('ABSPATH', dirname(__FILE__).'/'); require_once(ABSPATH.'wp-settings.php'); ?>

The included file “closet:dbaccess.php” contains the sensitive data:

< ?php // ** MySQL settings ** // define('DB_NAME', 'WPDB'); // The name of the database define('DB_USER', 'MyBlogMgr'); // Your MySQL username define('DB_PASSWORD', 'MyDBPassword'); // ...and password define('DB_HOST', 'localhost'); // 99% chance you won't need to change this // You can have multiple installations in one database if you give each a uniqu $table_prefix = 'prfx_'; // Only numbers, letters, and underscores please! ?>

Closet is a logical, referring to some location on the system that is inaccesable from the webserver (there is no mapping so the server will not be able to connect to it):

$ DEFINE/SYSTEM CLOSET SECDISK:[SECURED]

and have the directory W:E protection, and all files W:R.

Now the blog is normally accessable, and the sensitive data is hidden for the world.

Phishing using Paypal

Sometimes you see interesting attempts.

paypal phishing attempt

The header looks like this:

Return-Path: service@paypal.com
Received: from XXXXXXXXXX.GROOTERSNET.NL (192.168.0.2)
by xxxxxxxxxxxxx.grootersnet.nl (V5.6-9, OpenVMS V8.3 Alpha);
Mon, 29 Oct 2007 10:14:17 +0100 (CET)
Received: from www.outsidepride.com ([69.20.59.177] EXTERNAL) (EHLO
www.outsidepride.com) by xxxxxxxxxx.GROOTERSNET.NL ([192.168.0.200])
(PreciseMail V3.0); Sun, 28 Oct 2007 21:34:22 +0100
Received: from User ([89.137.232.120]) (authenticated bits=0) by
www.outsidepride.com (8.12.11.20060308/8.12.11) with ESMTP id l9SKWQo4011442;
Sun, 28 Oct 2007 16:32:27 -0400
Message-Id: <200710282032.l9SKWQo4011442@www.outsidepride.com>
From: "PayPal"<service@paypal.com>
Subject: You have 1 new Security Message Alert !
Date: Sun, 28 Oct 2007 22:32:56 +0200
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
X-Priority: 3
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal
X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 6.00.2600.0000
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2600.0000
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
X-MIME-Autoconverted: from 8bit to quoted-printable by www.outsidepride.com id
l9SKWQo4011442

Blocked by the anti-spam frontend, for the following reasons:

X-PMAS-External: www.outsidepride.com [69.20.59.177] (EHLO
www.outsidepride.com)
X-PMAS-Software: PreciseMail V3.0 [071027] (diana.GROOTERSNET.NL)
X-PMAS-DYN_URI-OK_URL: Dynamic URI check: OK URL (0.000)
X-PMAS-REPUTATION_URI_NONSPAM: URI reputation check (0.000)
X-PMAS-VMF-OK: Envelope FROM: check: Source accepts mail for address (0.000)
X-PMAS-HDR-MISSING_HEADERS: Missing To: header (1.035)
X-PMAS-HDR-CTYPE_JUST_HTML: HTML-only mail, with no text version (1.500)
X-PMAS-HDR-NO_SPACE_FROM: From: header is poorly formatted (no space) (5.000)
X-PMAS-URI-NORMAL_FTP_TO_IP: Uses a dotted-decimal IP address in URL (1.000)
X-PMAS-BDY-IMAGE_LINK: Image that links to web site (3.000)
X-PMAS-BDY-INCREASE_YOUR_SOMETHING: Message has phrase "Increase your..."
(3.000)
X-PMAS-BDY-FOR_MORE_INFO2: Includes "for more information" (1.500)
X-PMAS-META-FORGED_OUTLOOK_HTML: Outlook can't send HTML message only (1.101)
X-PMAS-META-FORGED_OUTLOOK_TAGS: Outlook can't send HTML in this format
(5.000)
X-PMAS-META-1PIXEL_IMG: Message includes 1x1 img link (20.000)
X-PMAS-META-PHISHING_02: Message appears to be a phishing scam (10.000)
X-PMAS-META-PHISHING_03: Message appears to be a PayPal phishing scam (20.000)
X-PMAS-META-DEAR_SOMETHING: Contains generic 'Dear (something)' (1.596)
X-PMAS-META-STOP_RECEIVING: Specific spam text "to stop receiving" (5.000)
X-PMAS-Final-Score: 78.732
X-PMAS-Spam-Level: ********************+
X-PMAS-Spam: Yes

Apart from the fact that the sender server is not within the Paypal domain 🙂

The interesting part is on the inside.
Most often, links refer to some site using the http protocol (never https, of course), but this one is different – twice using FTP got get your data:

<td class="pp_sansserif" align="center"><a
href="ftp://futangiu:futangiu@209.202.224.140/index.htm">Travelling
confirmation Here</a></td>

<td class="pp_sansserif" align="center"><a
href="ftp://futangiu:futangiu@209.202.224.140/index.htm">Re-activate your account Here</a></td>

The addresses mentioned are Romanian, at least, two of them.

  • 192.102.104.2 is indeed owned by onix.ro – it is possible that it;s a source of abuse: an internet cafe, probably
  • 217.156.19.129 is owend by vl.ro – named analog Digital Systems Inc. RDS – Radio Data Systems? That makes sense. But ause like this, I doubt it!
  • 62.177.188.59 is owned by bbeyond – a Dutch network operator without a Romanian domain: bbeyond.ro does not exist.
  • The address mentioned in the liks refers to a network operator in Canada, and there is an abuse address in their Whois data. So I’ll forward the message to them.

    Paypal phishing attempt blocked

    The phishing attemps are now blocked by the anti-spam gateway so they do no longer arrive in any of my mailboxes. Which, of course, is what it is the intended use, plus it allows a closer look to the message code without having the message actually delivered.

    This one came in a few days ago:

    <p><b><font face="Verdana" size="2">You are required to upgrade your PayPal
    Account by subscribing to our New Security Center.</font></b></p>
    <p><font face="Verdana" size="2">Please <b> <a href="http://202.67.156.66/www.paypal.com/cgi-bin/webscrcmd=_login-run/update.php">click here</a></b> in order to upgrade your PayPal account.</font></p>
    <p><font face="Verdana" size="2">If you not perform the update now, your account will be placed on hold. On hold accounts can still send money, but they cannot withdraw or receive funds.</font></p>

    Mind the hyperlink-address:

    http://202.67.156.66/www.paypal.com/cgi-bin/webscrcmd=_login-run/update.php

    This is NOT a paypal address.

    PMAS signalled this – as is shown in the message header:


    Received: from unknown ([72.54.216.109] EXTERNAL) (EHLO mail.iei-web.net) by
    xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ([192.168.0.200]) (PreciseMail V3.0); Sun, 07 Oct
    2007 06:41:42 +0100
    Received: from User [62.14.249.101] by iei-web.net with ESMTP (SMTPD-9.10) id
    A0F40294; Sat, 06 Oct 2007 23:39:00 -0600
    Reply-To: <member_service@paypalsecurity.com>
    From: "PayPal Inc."<member_service@paypalsecurity.com>
    Subject: New Paypal Security Center: Update Your Account
    Date: Sun, 7 Oct 2007 07:40:01 +0200
    MIME-Version: 1.0
    Content-Type: text/html; charset="Windows-1251"
    Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
    X-Priority: 3
    X-MSMail-Priority: Normal
    X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 6.00.2600.0000
    X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2600.0000
    Message-Id: <200710062339882.SM03048@User>

    What are the findings:


    X-PMAS-External: unknown [72.54.216.109] (EHLO mail.iei-web.net)
    X-PMAS-Software: PreciseMail V3.0 [071006] (diana.GROOTERSNET.NL)
    X-PMAS-DYN_URI-OK_URL: Dynamic URI check: OK URL (0.000)
    X-PMAS-VMF-OK: Envelope FROM: check: Source accepts mail for address (0.000)

    Quite well so far – except the “unknown” external address.
    But now the problems show up:


    X-PMAS-HDR-MISSING_HEADERS: Missing To: header (1.035)
    X-PMAS-HDR-CTYPE_JUST_HTML: HTML-only mail, with no text version (1.500)
    X-PMAS-HDR-RCVD_FROM_UNKNOWN: Message received from host without DNS entry (4.000)
    X-PMAS-HDR-NO_SPACE_FROM: From: header is poorly formatted (no space) (5.000)
    X-PMAS-URI-NORMAL_HTTP_TO_IP: Uses a dotted-decimal IP address in URL (0.942)
    X-PMAS-URI-IP_LINK_PLUS: Dotted-decimal IP address followed by CGI (0.708)
    X-PMAS-META-FORGED_OUTLOOK_HTML: Outlook can't send HTML message only (1.101)
    X-PMAS-META-MISSING_BODY_TAG: Message has </BODY> tag, but no <BODY> tag (3.000)
    X-PMAS-META-MISSING_HTML_TAG: Message has </HTML> tag, but no <HTML> tag (3.000)
    X-PMAS-META-FORGED_OUTLOOK_TAGS: Outlook can't send HTML in this format (5.000)

    You learn something new every day


    X-PMAS-META-NO_HTML_BEGIN: Message has </html> but not <html> (3.500)
    X-PMAS-META-PHISHING_01: Message is a phishing scam (50.000)
    X-PMAS-META-PHISHING_03: Message appears to be a PayPal phishing scam (20.000)
    X-PMAS-META-LAME_PAYPAL_SCAM: Claims to be from PayPal, but no PayPal URIs (20.000)

    I thought so 🙂


    X-PMAS-META-CLICK_BELOW: Asks you to click below (0.727)
    X-PMAS-META-BLIND_DATE3: Blind date spam (3) (20.000)
    X-PMAS-Final-Score: 139.513
    X-PMAS-Spam-Level: ********************+
    X-PMAS-Spam: Yes

    Apart from what is unusual in Paypal: no addressing header (should use your Paypal name).

    Another FTP script

    Another FTP script
    They come and go. There has been another attempt to access Diana as if it were a Windows or Linux box:

    %%%%%%%%%%% OPCOM 10-OCT-2007 22:56:22.43 %%%%%%%%%%%
    Message from user TCPIP$FTP on DIANA
    User Name: anonymous
    Source: s12.mgw-servers.de
    Status: NOPRIV -- File access violation
    Object: WEB_DISK2:[public.anonymous.071010235608p]

    It took less than a minute.
    The script starts with creating a directory – whci, of course, fails:

    %TCPIP-I-FTP_SESCON, FTP SERVER: session connection from s12.mgw-servers.de at 10-OCT-2007 22:56:21.45
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_NODE, client host name: s12.mgw-servers.de
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_USER, user name: anonymous
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: WEB_DISK2:[public.anonymous.071010235608p]
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_CHINFO, TCPIP$FTPC0000D: Failed to create directory
    %SYSTEM-F-NOPRIV, insufficient privilege or object protection violation
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_NODE, client host name: s12.mgw-servers.de

    and next, a larger list of directories is accessed:

    %TCPIP-I-FTP_USER, user name: anonymous
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /incoming/
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /upload/
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /public/incoming/
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /pub/incoming/
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /_vti_pvt/
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /_vti_txt/
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /_vti_log/
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /wwwroot/
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /anonymous/
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /public/
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /pub/
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /outgoing/
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /temp/
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /tmp/
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /anonymous/_vti_pvt/
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /anonymous/incoming/
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /mailroot/
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /ftproot/
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /anonymous/pub/
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /anonymous/public/
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /_vti_cnf/
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /anonymous/_vti_cnf/
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /images/
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /_private/
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /cgi-bin/
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /usr/
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /usr/incoming/
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /home/
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /public_html/
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /public_ftp/
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /_vti_cnf/
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /tagged/
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: / /
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /%/
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /data/
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /inetpub/
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /Tagged/
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /TaGGeD/
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /income/
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /recieved/
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /download/
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /My Shared Folder/
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /_kurdt/
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /.htaccess/
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /.private/
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /~tmp/
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /~temp/
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /html/
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /www/
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /web/
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /anonymous/_vti_txt/
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /anonymous/_vti_log/
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /anonymous/outgoing/
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /mailroot/
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /_private/
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /_vti_cfg/
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /site/
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /page/
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /ftp/
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /new/
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /root/
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /stuff/
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /dir/
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /dirs/
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /pass/
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /log/
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /folder/
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /recycler/
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /sql/
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /MS_OFFICE2K/
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /Printer Drivers/
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /ww/
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /webctrlsamp/
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /web/
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /bin/
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /OFFICE/
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /bilder/
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /admin/
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /file/
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /img/
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /logging/
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /website/
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /site/
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /inetpub/wwwroot/
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /inetpub/www/
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /wwwroot/www/
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /dump/
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /de/
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /sitedump/
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /archives/
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /WUTemp/
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /win.asp/
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /inetpub/
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /en/
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /lang/
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /language/
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /WinNT/
    %TCPIP-I-FTP_OBJ, object: /WINDOWS/

    All fail because of ” invalid directory syntax”
    It might be that the script tries to PUSH data onto the system, not GET. The log does not mention it.
    I tried the source. This seems to be a start-up company, stating to be (translated from German) “A company of today with the technology and know-how of tomorrow”. Their website isn’t ready yet.
    Nor is their security.
    If this is tomorrow’s technology and know-how, I have no confidence in it. My quite basic, 30-year old OpenVMS installation does a much better job without the fancy stuff.

    I have signalled the attempt to them. Wait and seen what comes out of it.
    UPDATE
    I got a message stating it should be sent to their ABUSE address, so I did. From there, I got the message the message was forwarded to their customer. It might be genuine but what if that customer caused the problems?